The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act aims
to improve Policing Accountability, but who holds G4S accountable?
With an increasing number of police forces considering
privatisation contracts to G4S, concerns arise as to how this worldwide
security solutions group will be held accountable under the Coalition’s
accountability policing reforms.
Throughout previous weeks there have
been numerous reports and articles highlighting that G4S will be running numerous
parts of the UK’s police service within the next 5 years. Both the West
Midlands and Surrey forces are expected to sign a deal worth £1.5bn which if
successful could see contracts handed to G4S to investigate crimes, run
prisoner removal units, undertake forensic duties and manage intelligence.
G4S is now a worldwide security
solutions group, managing over 657,000 staff across 125 countries in five
continents; a company that has seen profits double since 2005 to over £7.5bn. It
currently has duties securing airports around the world, VIP protection,
Pentagon security along with thousands of global security contracts.
In the UK many of G4S’s contracts have
now amalgamated into previously government run areas of security, including
prisons, policing, securing the Government Communications Headquarters, running
immigration detention centres and security at schools and hospitals. These
contracts have seen the security company’s previous intake from UK Government
operations in 2005 rise from 15% total revenue to 27% in 2011.
Future proposed contracts are expected
to include forensics, crime investigation, 999 call handling as well as custody
and detention of prisoners and suspects, areas that many senior and ranked
officers claim are core roles of the police service. And with little say or
option to democratically scrutinise these changes by the public and the failure
of the Coalition government to listen to highly experienced officers in these
fields, concerns have arisen regarding the long term future implications these
privatisation changes could have on the public justice, accountability,
transparency and equality of the police in the UK.
Ten more forces throughout England and
Wales, including Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire have also
announced consideration of privatisation to tackle the government funding
shortfall. Lancashire, Staffordshire and parts of Wales already have G4S
running more than 500 custody suites, but the new contracts being proposed and
put into action see the security force’s roles becoming more intrusive and invasive
in the day to day operational duties of the police.
But many questions are now beginning to
be asked about the hastiness of Police Authorities and the Government to
privatise forces. Some 23,700 employees will be trained by G4S for the Olympic
Games due to start at the end of July costing £284m. This includes military
personnel, and 10,000 of these will be employed by the security firm (Announced
shortfall of 3500 11th July). Many critics of the privatisation of
police claim that before any contracts are considered or signed the performance
of G4S should be reviewed during this worldwide high profile event. However,
recent reports suggest already that G4S is failing to deliver the level of
security expected in the lead up to the games, here are some examples
Hundreds of sniffer dog searches
for explosives at the Olympic Park were NEVER carried out in a major security
scandal. It has transpired that for 3 years numerous canine vehicle and person
checks were allegedly not undertaken. Dog handlers were falsely placed into
rotas on their days off. (http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/sport/olympics/4387664/Security-scandal-at-the-Olympic-stadium.html)
Whistleblower sacked
after speaking out about G4S cutting corners when vetting security staff for
the Olympics. In this case an individual claims
that she was entrusted with processing and vetting employees for the Olympics, handling
all forms of identification documents, despite not being vetted herself. She
states that the teams were expected to carry out 10 applications per hour which
led to piles of paperwork piling up in the offices. (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2153783/Whistleblower-sacked-speaking-G4S-cutting-corners-vetting-security-staff.html)
Exclusive:
Undercover Reporter Infiltrates Security Firm to Expose London Olympics, this
story is an undercover reporters account of the inadequate training that the
numerous security guards and staff are currently getting at the Olympic site,
reporter states that the numbers of visitors getting through is a priority over
security checks that should be taking place upon entry to the site during the
games.
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Si7DEkeWsOs&feature=related)
These examples raise concerns regarding
the importance of public safety and security over financial gain and profit
margins at the Olympic site. Transfer these concerns into the privatisation of
policing and this becomes even more concerning. This raises questions regarding
the accountability of private sector firms and who they are answerable too when
mistakes occur.
Privatisation Accountability
As discussed in my
previous Blog article: Police:
The Coalition’s new Tripartite System of political interference the accountability structure of policing
is due to see some dramatic changes. These changes will see Chief Constables
being held to account by newly elected Police and Crime Commissioners; these in
turn will be answerable to Police and Crime Panels and debatably but not yet
confirmed HMIC. These changes enacted by the Police Reform and Social
Responsibility Act are designed to hold police forces to account by the public.
What is unclear however is how private firms will be held to
account in a front line public service such as the police.
As with the
whistleblower case above, the individual responsible for informing the media of
the alleged failings of the Olympic vetting system had her contract terminated.
Should a G4S employee commit a gross misconduct offence in a policing role
however, who is that individual answerable too, G4S or the Police? Confusion of
this nature can be further expressed in Lincolnshire where 575 police staff are
due to be transferred to a new G4S run police station in a £200m contract deal,
200 of whom will be wearing uniforms bearing a Lincolnshire Police badge
alongside the G4S logo. In this instance is the police working for G4S or G4S
working for the police? There needs to be a clear distinction.
Despite their age, the nine principles
of policing set out in the 19th century are still a good example of
how Sir Robert Peel felt policing should be ‘for the public’ and not ‘against’
it. The development of these principles was to create a police force that
‘Policed by Consent’ and not fear:
‘This conception of a police
force was 'unique in history and throughout the world because it derived not
from fear but almost exclusively from public co-operation with the police,
induced by them designedly by behaviour which secures and maintains for them
the approval, respect and affection of the public'
A New Study of Police History by
Charles Reith (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1956)
These principles were issued to all
Metropolitan Police officers in 1829 (Labelled General Instructions) and are
the foundation of policing; the integrity of these foundations may be at risk
with the introduction of privatisation.
The nine principles are outlined below:
1. To prevent crime and
disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity
of legal punishment.
2. To recognise always
that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent
on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their
ability to secure and maintain public respect.
3. To recognise always
that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also
the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing
observance of laws.
4. To recognise always
that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured
diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and
compulsion for achieving police objectives.
5. To seek and preserve
public favour, not by pandering to public opinion; but by constantly
demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of
policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of
individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all
members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by
ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour; and by ready offering of
individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
6. To use physical force
only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be
insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure
observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of
physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a
police objective.
7. To maintain at all
times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic
tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police,
the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time
attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of
community welfare and existence.
8. To recognise always
the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain
from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals
or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.
9. To recognise always
that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and
not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.
Principle number 2 defines that ‘power of the police to fulfil their
functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence,
actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public
respect’. With the current speed
that the government and Police Authorities are implementing privatisation into
police forces, it is strongly questionable that firstly the public are aware of
the existence of these police changes, and secondly that they approve of them.
Principle 5 highlights impartiality in
the office of constable and the independence of policy. As discussed above with
the uncertainty of accountability and with the examples highlighted from the
Olympic site, we may see privatised firms focusing on profit margins and
cutting corners rather than ensuring impartial approaches to investigations and
policing methods, thereby being detrimental to the core principles of policing.
Uncertainty also arises when
considering whose targets privatised policing staff will be expected to meet.
Each of the 43 police forces sets out targets to tackle local and national
crime and works in collaboration with other forces. Difficult questions must be
asked whether a global company like G4S has the necessary experience and is
flexible enough to meet local policing requirements. One solution to this
problem is to allow the police force to dictate the full roles and
responsibilities of the G4S staff, but this would be deemed unlikely since the
contractual agreement and fee must contain G4S targets and regulations. Further
concerns surround how G4S will be able to disseminate and collaborate with
other forces and whether a fee will incur for none privatised forces to obtain
information or assistance, for example in the form of mutual aid.
Particular focus should be given to
principle number 7 that states ‘the
police are the public and the public are the police’. Applying this
principle to a private global security company is difficult since it could be
argued that their purpose is to provide a service that is best value for money
in the interests of the company, not best value for policing of the public. In the interests of community welfare and
existence consideration must be applied to the appearance of G4S staff in a
policing role. With regards to welfare would the public feel safe and confident
having officers police their neighbourhoods with a G4S logo on their uniforms,
a logo that is associated with ‘security’ not policing?
Conservative MP Nick De Bois recently
requested the figures of how many individuals had interfered or breached their
tagging systems managed by Serco and G4S throughout the UK in a £100m contract.
It transpired that the security companies’ databases are inadequately equipped
to measure, collate and disseminate the amount of breaches that have occurred
under their supervision. With an estimated 180,000 expected to be
electronically tagged and satellite monitored in the UK, there is apprehension
as to how these private companies will have the capabilities to develop and
maintain adequate policing databases that provide crucial statistical data and
facts expected by the Home Office and the public to ensure the efficiency and
effectiveness of the police forces they represent.
In reference to accountability however,
if their privatised systems fail to identify simple figures surrounding how
many people interfere with their security tagging system and how many breach
their curfew conditions, how can they be expected to monitor and collate the
relevant information required to police and protect a county such as
Lincolnshire for example containing nearly 700,000 citizens? Even more
concerning is that the government appears reserved in obtaining these figures
and holding G4S and Serco to account for failing to do so, claiming that in
2013 a new contract is being negotiated for the next generation of electronic
monitoring systems, which includes proposals to improve management systems and
data collection. From the perspective of the public however, one must question
the importance of these figures when considering the safety and security of the
public, especially before developing new contracts if there have been major
failings in the monitoring and security operations of criminals on early
release from prison or under curfew orders.
Privatisation: Legal Issues
One of the most recent announcements
from Cambridgeshire Constabulary is a reduction in its police canine unit, cuts
which will see the unit cut from approximately 85 canines to 25 and 45 handlers
down to 22. Of the two options being considered, the first amalgamation with
other forces, the second being privatisation with the introduction of private
handlers and canines, the question of legality comes to light. There are two main
branches of canine unit, the first, public order and crime prevention, the
second search dogs (drugs, explosives etc).
Should a security solutions group like
G4S or Serco take responsibility for providing canine dogs and handlers for
public order duties and crime prevention, such as chasing a fleeing suspect
from an abandoned stolen vehicle for example, would this be lawful under our
legal system? From my own research into this question there appears to be
conflicting arguments surrounding the private use of canines that are trained
to potentially inflict harm on human beings.
The uses of these types of police dog
are outlined below:
1. Pursuing and detaining a suspect who is making off
2. Engaging and detaining a suspect who presents a threat
3. Guarding and escorting suspects after apprehension
4. Defending handler against attack
5. Defending other officers against attack
6. Protecting members of the public
7. Protecting property
8. Defending itself against attack
9. Crowd control
Before releasing the dog
the handling officer needs to give a verbal warning as to the presence of the
dog and of their, the officer’s, intentions (s24 12.2 of the ACPO Police Dogs Manual of Guidance 2011).
Observe that the term
used prior to the release of the dog states ‘officer’ which highlights the first legal question surrounding the
use of private units; would a private handler be classified as an officer? The next area to consider is
whether a non-police trained canine is allowed to be used for this purpose in a
public place. Again there is vagueness surrounding the use of private canines
in this environment. It is accepted that a security dog inside a private
perimeter with warning signs stating that canine patrols are operating would
result in legal use where a perpetrator receives an injury, however, in a
public place where warning signs would not be visible, it must be considered
that canine units and handlers not under the police remit would be illegally
operating and would therefore breach the Dangerous Dogs Act.
Between 2008-11 the
police were required to pay £770,000 in compensation claims for police canine
related injuries. This begs the question that in the circumstances of similar
claims being made against privatised security canine units, who would be
responsible, the police or private company?
The use of search dogs
for drugs / explosives etc raises yet more legal implications for private
companies. Where private sector canine teams are used and evidence is found,
what protocols do the police have in place for private security personnel, 1/
to report that evidence, and 2/ to handle the evidence? As previously
discussed, it is not yet known whether a security handler could be classified
as an officer. This would mean that a handler who finds evidence such as Class
A drugs would have to call for police assistance to handle and collect the
evidence, thereby acquiring more costs for the police and undermining the very
reasons for privatisation.
If privatisation occurs the potential
roles of G4S could be to investigate crimes, carry out forensic duties and
manage intelligence. This raises legal implications particularly about the
continuity of evidence and the abilities of a private security solutions group
to handle these policing operations, and in present circumstances where
privatised firms are used for forensic duties and intelligence purposes, they
are already specialised in said areas and are not awaiting contractual
agreement before developing and recruiting the required assets and staff to
undertake such duties.
From a prosecution perspective I
believe criminal convictions could be unsafe where evidence leaves the custody
of the police and into the hands of a security group who doesn’t specialise in
that particular area. As discussed above, G4S and Serco have already shown
failings in their information systems to collate competent data for the
electronic monitoring systems they have in place. Where the continuity of
evidence has been interrupted by a company such as G4S, there is concern that
the defence will question the competency of these firms to handle such evidence
and intelligence, meaning higher prosecution costs to supply experts and
witnesses, again undermining the reasoning behind privatisation and diverting
and increasing expenditure in other sectors of the Criminal Justice System.
Privatisation Solution
Whilst there has been a Police Reform and Social
Responsibility Act designed to completely re-shape the accountability structure
of the police, there are no sections included for privatisation, concerning as
even whilst this Act was being drafted, police privatisation was surely a
potential element of the police reforms by the Coalition?
Whilst there are regulations in place for the use of
particular privatised companies such as forensic specialists, I believe where
such large sectors of the police are due to be privatised there should be
legislation in place as a safeguard to protect the future and integrity of
policing. This new Bill would also remove any small Sections of legislation
regulating private companies in a public service role from other Acts and
centralise them into one main piece of legislation.
This Police
Privatisation Act would include Sections regarding: (These are the most
crucial areas I believe should be legislated)
The accountability of a privatised company working for a
police force and individuals working for said company:
- - The
accountability of the private company in the event of (Gross) misconduct shall
be liable under the same conditions as a police force and accountable to HMIC,
ACPO, IPCC etc.
- - Individuals
shall be held to the same accountability as any other serving officer in the
police. (The company responsible for the employment of the individual will be
required to pay the costs for the investigation, along with fines incurred for
the misconduct, payable to the relevant police force).
- - In the
event of individual misconduct, whilst it is the responsibility of the police
force to investigate and decide the course of action for the matter,
accountability lies with the company who employs the individual as to ensure
private and police misconduct is measured separately.
Contractual regulations:
- - Contracts
should be reviewed by the Government, Police Regulators and Federations as well
as independently to ensure fairness.
- - Reviews should
be undertaken regularly to assess training, recruitment, vetting and
operational procedures to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.
- - A House
of Commons and House of Lords vote should be held to decide a relevant time
frame for consultation of privatisation contracts. The length of a private
contract should also be established at this time and be made obligatory.
- - Privatisation
should be open to public scrutiny and open to a public and police vote.
- - Privatisation
should be tendered, not necessarily to the highest bidder but to the most
efficient and effective application that benefits the public and police force.
- - Where
forces are considering amalgamation through privatisation, each involved police
force should apply separately for permission to privatise, and review
individual tender applications alongside amalgamation applications.
- - Where
separate policing departments are privatised, for example police call handling
and forensic management; these shall remain contractually separate to ensure
that where misconduct occurs they can be dealt with appropriately without
affecting different departments under the same privatisation company control.
- - Renewal
of contracts should be open to tender; this ensures renewal of contract is once
again chosen for the benefit of the public and police force.
Fulfillment of contract:
- - Privatisation
contracts should be based on set targets to ensure fulfilment. These targets
should be set by the relevant parties (Home Secretary, PCC’s, Police Force, HMIC,
ACPO etc)
- - These targets
should be subject to change from said parties to ensure effectiveness and
efficiency.
- - Reviews
from said parties and independent reviews (With Government Authorisation) may
occur at any time throughout contractual period. Private companies must offer full
compliance and access subject to all regulations held for police reviews in
England and Wales.
- - Recommendations
can be made based on above reviews and must be emplaced in the time frame
allocated by the relevant parties.
- - Failure
to meet the required targets, based on a final review will result in financial
penalties for the private company.
- - Gross
misconduct of contract may result in termination and strong financial penalties.
Relevant safeguards must be agreed by all parties in the event of termination.
- - In the
event of termination all operational staff shall be obligated to remain under
police force control until a contract renewal occurs.
Mutual Aid and Dissemination of Information
- - Private
firms should comply with current police mutual aid agreements and NOT be authorised to charge additional
costs outside of the regulations for assistance
- - Dissemination
of police evidence, intelligence and all other relevant policing materials
shall occur in compliance with current police force regulations as well as the
Criminal Justice System and NO
authorisation shall be given to charge additional costs outside of those
regulations or withhold said materials.
Legality of a private company in the police force:
- - All
individuals working for the police shall be subject to the same police oath,
accountability and ethics held by the office of constable.
- - The
powers of the private company’s individual roles however will not be the same
as the office of constable and will be set by the relevant parties.
- - The
Crown Prosecution Service and Criminal Justice System must agree that private
companies comply and meet their requirements; not only of the police but to
ensure their handling of police operations, evidence and intelligence is
capable of being used for prosecution. This should be undertaken at the cost of
the private company.
Whilst this Police
Privatisation Bill I have proposed appears to strongly control the private
companies and penalise strongly for failure to fulfil contractual agreements, I
feel that this is necessary due to not only the financial risks but the risks
that it poses to the future of policing. As discussed throughout this Blog
article I believe there should be clear distinction between the police and
private company to ensure that figures and targets can be clearly monitored.
This not only would help efficiency and effectiveness of their operations but
ensure that where failings do occur, the offending party can be clearly
established. The proposals for CPS and CJS approval and recognition is a
crucial element to ensure that areas of the CJS are not hit with excessive
court proceeding costs trying to justify and prove that the use of the private
company meets prosecution requirements.
Whilst I don’t purport to be an expert in this field I do
feel that with the inevitability of police privatisation looming, and despite
my strong objection against privatisation, the government should be developing
stringent methods of controlling and maintaining these new companies, ensuring
that axiomatic role of the police which is the safety and protection of our
public is not overtaken by corporate profit margins and policing on the cheap.
I hope you share my
views and I welcome comments through my Twitter account #M_Martin2. The views
expressed in this article are my own.
I finish this Blog Article with a quote, though questionable
on its origins I feel it is very fitting when considering the police reforms
and privatisation, I ask the reader to consider the speed with which the
Coalition government aims to incorporate these changes into policing before
reading this and consider how it intensifies the resulting consequences.
"We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. Presumably the plans for our employment were being changed. I was to learn later in life that, perhaps because we are so good at organizing, we tend as a nation to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization."
"We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. Presumably the plans for our employment were being changed. I was to learn later in life that, perhaps because we are so good at organizing, we tend as a nation to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization."
